I’ve heard several stories about John McCain’s "tough stance" over the Russian-Georgian conflict on NPR, how it helps burnish his "national security credentials." Similar stories appear elsewhere in the supposedly liberal media. Rarely in the same story do we hear or read that McCain foreign policy adviser Randy Scheunemann is also a well-paid lobbyist for the nation of Georgia. The "liberal" New York Times snuck this fact into an inside story under the innocuous ("don’t bother to read me") headline: "In Split Role, McCain Adviser is Sometimes a Lobbyist."
Were the situations reversed, this would be a scandal of the first magnitude for Barack Obama. But, as I have noted before, the corporate media and corporate rulers of America have to take him out. So here is one more way to do it. Forgive me for being cynical — after two stolen presidential elections, the serial scandals of the Bush years, secret energy task force, etc. — but are we seeing a new cold war ginned up to benefit McCain?
Where is our ‘liberal’ mainstream media on reports of Karl Rove meeting with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, soon after the Georgian leader met with Condoleezza Rice in July. Hello?…Any curiosity? The White House has denied that Rice gave a green light to the impulsive Georgian president. Ah, but I remember all those color-coded "threat" warnings being raised and "high profile" terror arrests that went nowhere during the 2004 campaign. They succeeded in scaring enough people to make it a close enough election to steal.
McCain could win just because enough voters won’t cast a ballot for a black man, but the oligarchy apparently isn’t taking any chances. As usual, the national interests of the United States are cast aside.
It’s not true, as some leftist scholars claimed, that America started the first Cold War. Stalin was determined to enslave Eastern Europe and, as his paranoia deepened, may even have been contemplating a hot war with the West when he mercifully died. But this new confrontation with Russia is different. While the Russians over-reacted, and the ethnic minorities allied with them sought revenge against Georgians, American foreign policy set the stage.
One had to love the irony of Bush and his minions lecturing the Kremlin about how invading other countries and using military force is not the way civilized nations behave in the 21st century. But the Iraq precedent, along with America squandering its diplomatic and moral authority (we torture), was only the beginning of our problems.
Bush foolishly pushed expansion of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, a move his supposed Russia expert Condi could have told him would be an unacceptable situation for Moscow. Kosovo was recognized, enraging Russians. Bush moved ahead with an (unreliable) anti-missile radar and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland despite ongoing Russian warnings. Nobody seriously believes the system could stop a massive Russian launch, but why antagonize and ignore a large and resurgent nation? Any casual student of Russian history could have told you these were foolish, dangerous moves. And then we emboldened Georgia’s young leader in his effort to retake two small provinces where most people do not want to be part of Georgia.
If John McCain has so much trusted national security and foreign policy experience, where exactly did he misplace it while all this was going on? Or is he just the prop in a deeper game involving his lobbyist-adviser and the Republican "August surprise"? Not only will a simplistic play of villain Russia ("Putin is Hitler!") stomping "innocent" Georgia help scare Americans to the right, it will be very profitable for defense contractors in the McCain administration.
In truth, nothing is simple in the world, especially in the Caucasus, where grudges go back centuries and nobody’s hands are without blood, including Georgia’s. Russia is a potentially dangerous "neo-imperialist" power, as others have said, but its intervention against Georgia was brought on by brash actions of the Scheunemann-, Rove- and, perhaps, Rice-advised Georgian leadership.
Most frighteningly, the simpleton narratives used to win elections with the no-attention-span American electorate make for poor policy guides in a complex world. It’s one where frontal attacks can make us less safe, while diplomacy and well-informed policy are powerful weapons. But…they think we’re stupid, and if the polls are to be believed, we’re not disappointing them.
Jon, what is even more astonishing is the administration’s public reaction of surprise … given that the Russians invaded Georgia with such magnitude of force. That area of the world is well covered by spy satellites. These cameras can tell if you’re holding a quarter heads up or down. Our government had to have known weeks in advance that Russia was massing arms and troops at the border of Georgia. I believe they may have knowingly allowed Georgia to be suckered into a conflict. There is no other logical conclusion.
“Tom H” seems to be in full spin-control mode on behalf of someone. Georgia invaded South Ossetia on August 7th. Russia did not respond militarily until the next day. That would scarcely have been the case had Russia been “massing arms and troops” on the Georgian border “weeks in advance” in preparation for a conflict.
Nor is there any evidence I am aware of that Georgia was “suckered” into a conflict. Exactly how, “Tom H”, do you propose that the Russians convinced the Georgian President to attempt a military take-over of South Ossetia? And more to the point, what is your evidence?
Until you resolve these issues, the “only logical conclusion” is that Georgia overreached, and that Russia took care to give it a bloody nose to discourage further adventurism. That the Russians (and the irregular forces from South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia — the ones wearing white arm-bands which the Russians apparently allowed to run riot) overstepped the bounds of a measured response, is not in dispute.
At least, not by me. The Russians may have something to say in their own defense, but I doubt that I shall hear it in the American media, and I must judge events by what I can garner from English language news organs that are commonly regarded as responsible.
Mr. Talton wrote:
“It’s not true, as some leftist scholars claimed, that America started the first Cold War. Stalin was determined to enslave Eastern Europe and, as his paranoia deepened, may even have been contemplating a hot war with the West when he mercifully died.”
I agree that the Stalinists were determined to enslave Eastern Europe. Given that, whether the West started the Cold War or not is almost irrelevant.
Stalin’s final years were marked by increasingly odd behavior, which carried over into the domestic policies of the Soviet Union. Whether or not he might have sought direct military conflict with the West is unknown to me, though I am skeptical. We do know that yet another bloody purge (the “Jewish Doctors’ plot”) was in the works, and that this was stopped only by his death.
Emil Pulsifer ~ You may have missed my point. It was not about who started the conflict nor for what reason(s). My point is: we (the US) knew if Georgia reacted to “disturbances” in South Ossetia, the Russians were prepared, ready and willing to move swiftly into the territory … and beyond. Further, we did not strongly discourage Georgia from reacting. Our intelligence had to have shown that … (or they were asleep at the desk). Thus, my question is: Why would we want, or at minimum not discourage, Georgia from provoking the situation?
I stand by my point. Georgia was suckered into reacting … to benefit the interests of people in the administration.
As an aside, I certainly wish more individuals knew of Jon’s site (here) and contributed to the conversation. It’s difficult to have an intelligent conversation with the local news paper blogs. The brain dead show up quickly …
“Tom H”, I may have been a bit quick on the trigger. If so, my apologies. (And thanks for clarifying.)
Given:
(1) The presence of Russian peacekeepers (or “peacekeepers” if one prefers the American media’s presentation of these matters) — which is to say Russian soldiers, whatever you call them — stationed in South Ossetia for the purpose of discouraging Georgian attempts to retake the region, and as an expression of Russian designs on and solidarity with the South Ossetian people;
(2) And given the fact that South Ossetians, having won their independence from Georgia in a bitter war in 1992, were unsympathetic to Georgia and had already expressed considerable interest in being reunited with North Ossetia (i.e., politically absorbed by Russia, whether or not retaining some degree of autonomy);
(3) And given the general attitude of Moscow these days;
it does INDEED seem OBVIOUS that the reaction of the Russian government would be a quick and ruthless military counterattack.
(4) It is also obvious that Russia’s military would quickly overwhelm Georgia’s military WITHOUT U.S. INTERVENTION — a fact that Georgia itself could scarcely overlook.
(5) It is also obvious, at least for Americans with a sophisticated view of such things, that the United States was not going to war with Russia over South Ossetia or even over Georgia.
(6) Given the reaction of the Georgian president — bitter tears (literally) of recrimination flowing as he castigated the United States, with Condi Rice standing at his side, for not providing support — and given Georgia’s realistic MILITARY understanding of the situation, it seems obvious that Georgia must have been misled by its POLITICAL expectations: that Georgia did not launch a military invasion of South Ossetia under such circumstances merely with an idle wish or hope for American intervention, but with an expectation based on strong suggestions or even informal promises — especially if made by third party intermediaries whose words were strongly suggestive but ambiguously phrased, and could be rebutted even in the worst case as simply not being a statement of formal U.S. foreign policy.
(7) Then if such suggestions or informal promises were made by the United States or its emissaries, reassuring Georgia of U.S. intervention should the Russians (quite predictably) react militarily, it can only be the case that these were offered in bad faith.
(8) The question then arises, why encourage such actions in bad faith? The answer seems to be, as “Tom H” suggests, that Georgia was a pawn in an overarching U.S. propaganda strategy. The exact details of such a strategy, if it existed, could only be speculated upon here: but certain possibilities have already been suggested, and others might be considered.
So, the general thesis does not seem implausible on its face, and I thank “Tom H” for sticking to his guns.
I would argue that a hefty show of force really was necessary on the Russian’s part. Obviously the USA has been encouraging Georgia to be bolder than would be wise. Already the Russians tried subtle force and it was ignored.
Escalating one little bit at a time becomes like an auction where the bidders get more and more excited and push themselves to win despite bidding well beyond what the article is worth. Step in with a sizable bid right near the start and everyone backs off.
Russia doesn’t want Georgia to run off and join NATO or anything like that. They want to make sure that the Georgian people get a real good idea of what the options are, and also make it 100% clear to the USA that Russia simply does not get easily intimidated.
It is a brutal situation, but allowing things to gradually build up would have resulted in a something like Iraq (ultimately a lot more brutal). Hopefully, Georgia will wake up and realise that the US hangs their allies out to dry anytime it suits. Maybe they should be glad of the independence that they still have.
Tel, I’m not sure if they have the comic strip “Peanuts” in New South Wales, but about once a year the character Lucy tempts Charlie Brown with an offer to hold his football while he kicks it. Every time, without fail, she pulls it out from under him at the last second, and he falls flat on his back. Yet, he never stops accepting her offers, apparently believing that this will be the year when he actually gets to kick that football.
You would think that after Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, a country like Georgia would understand that if the United States would not intervene at the height of the Cold War, with all that was at stake, on behalf of those major European countries, it was not going to intervene on behalf of Georgia in 2008, in the context of a minor territorial dispute and under circumstances in which Georgia initiated military hostilities.
But apparently Georgia did expect this, or had been otherwise sweet-talked into thinking it could get away with it despite massively superior Russian military forces under the control of Vladimir Putin and friends.
I don’t know what was said to Georgia. Perhaps military intervention per se wasn’t mentioned. Perhaps the U.S. had managed to convince Georgia that it had some non-existent leverage over Moscow. At any rate, Georgia’s disappointment was par for the course. The U.S. government may support its allies, but minor entities had better make sure of their position as ally rather than pawn before they bite off more than they can chew.
The cynicism of the U.S. government is truly astonishing, but only for those of us who expect it to be better than others.
In 1991, George H.W. Bush broadcast an exhortation to Iraqis on Voice of America, urging them to revolt against Saddam Hussein. A radio station called the Voice Of Free Iraq, also broadcast messages exhorting the Iraqi people to rise up and overthrow Hussein. NBC News and the New York Times (citing government sources) both reported that this radio station was run by the CIA. And numerous other attempts had been made by the United States to incite popular uprisings.
The sad thing about this is that the U.S. government, while wanting to see Saddam Hussein deposed, did not want to see the ruling Baath Party destroyed: it was run by a Sunni minority hostile to Iran. Free democracy in Iraq, without an occupation force in place to “guide” it, might have meant an Iraq strongly allied to Iran, given the Shiite majority in Iraq and given longstanding friendly relations between a number of influential Shiite Iraqi clerics and their counterparts in Iran. The U.S. was concerned that Iran would rush to fill the power vacuum created by the destruction of the Baath Party.
There was also concern that in an Iraq divided into regional segments, Kurds in the north would support PKK rebels in Turkey, further disrupting U.S. regional alliances and the balance of power.
That, in my opinion, is the real reason why Bush left the Iraqi Republican Guard in place rather than destroying it, and why he did not finish the job with a drive to Baghdad. In order to have the kind of “democracy” in Iraq which the U.S. wanted, an extended military occupation would have been necessary, and at the time that wasn’t worth the political fall-out.
The whole point of the economic sanctions subsequently imposed, was to encourage the Baath Party leadership to eliminate Hussein by means of an internal coup, by making life inside Iraq less comfortable than they might prefer. Of course, Hussein’s control of the state security apparatus made this unrealistic.
As for the civilian uprising encouraged by the U.S. in its propaganda broadcasts, it could not succeed in the long run without U.S. military intervention. Did the U.S. fulfill its expected obligations? No. The U.S. could at least have provided support by shooting down the helicopter gunships which Hussein used to crush the revolt. After all, the cease-fire agreement created an Iraqi “no-fly zone”. (It’s true that the terms of the agreement referred to “fixed-wing aircraft”, but the U.S., had it been inclined, could have insisted on a broad interpretation under the circumstances, or simply justified such intervention on humanitarian grounds.)
So, the sad fact is that the United States knowingly encouraged a civilian uprising which it knew could not succeed without U.S. military intervention, then stood by while the government of Saddam Hussein ruthlessly crushed it. The point of the uprising, it seems, was destabilization; the creation of circumstances making an internal Baathist coup possible — something the United States had been encouraging behind the scenes for quite some time.
A recent Associated Press item, “Russia warned to change course”, contained a vague but interesting statement at the end:
“And a key civil nuclear agreement between Moscow and Washington appears likely to be shelved until next year at the earliest.”
The article says nothing more about it. I presume this refers to the U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, announced during the 2006 G8 Summit. Washington had long opposed such an agreement, so the reversal was somewhat unusual.
According to a research paper produced the same month (July 2006) by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies), one of the chief reasons for longstanding U.S. opposition to the agreement involved Russia’s plans for work on Iran’s nuclear power industry:
“The United States has, until recently, for example, opposed Russian construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran, at Bushehr. Washington has accused Russia of providing assistance to Iranian activities that could contribute to its development of nuclear weapons and introduced sanctions against several Russian institutes and companies suspected of assisting Iran in acquiring nuclear and missile technology and expertise. Washington has also faulted Russia for opposing tougher measures to persuade Tehran to stop its uranium enrichment activities, work that could ultimately provide Iran with the material needed to manufacture nuclear weapons.”
https://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_78.html
Nevertheless, the agreement was announced. Apparently the U.S. finally relented based on perceptions that Russia had “become more inclined to exert pressure on Iran to curtail its nuclear program development”.
If, however, that perception has since changed (perhaps based on intelligence that cannot be publicized because to do so would reveal the existence of a covert information source, or perhaps in response to pragmatic considerations arising in the corporate sphere), Washington would have a strong motive for refusing implementation of the agreement. Of course, to do so unilaterally might be politically inconvenient.
If, however, Russia could be framed in world media and political discourse as a kind of rogue state, U.S. refusal to implement the agreement (no doubt phrased in terms of an indefinite “postponement”) would be more feasible.
Today’s New York Times carried two new stories on the Georgian conflict and I found two items of interest I thought I would pass along. Regarding the second item, I wonder what Georgian control of South Ossetia would have meant for the Nabucco project:
* * *
In the field, there is evidence from an extensive set of witnesses that within 30 minutes of Mr. Saakashvili’s order, Georgia’s military began pounding civilian sections of the city of Tskhinvali, as well as a Russian peacekeeping base there, with heavy barrages of rocket and artillery fire.
The barrages all but ensured a Russian military response, several diplomats, military officers and witnesses said.
After the Russian columns arrived through the Roki Tunnel, and the battle swung quickly into Russia’s favor, Georgia said its attack had been necessary to stop a Russian attack that already had been under way.
To date, however, there has been no independent evidence, beyond Georgia’s insistence that its version is true, that Russian forces were attacking before the Georgian barrages.
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/europe/03georgia.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
* * *
Mr. Putin, in Uzbekistan, announced an agreement to build a new natural gas pipeline to Russia from Central Asia, frustrating European and American efforts to ship oil and gas directly to the West. A Western-backed pipeline project, Nabucco, is now in doubt, as it would have to pass close to South Ossetia.
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/europe/03russia.html
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